Connie Chan’s ties to China’s propaganda outlet, Sing Tao Daily, raise concerns about foreign influence in local congressional race to succeed Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi.
In the shadow of Nancy Pelosi’s retirement, California’s 11th Congressional District—the heart of San Francisco—has become ground zero for one of the most scrutinized Democratic primaries of 2026. The June 2 primary pits progressive Supervisor Connie Chan against the progressive Harvard-educated tech entrepreneur Saikat Chakrabarti, and State Sen. Scott Wiener, a very familiar face in the LGBTQ community — perhaps even awkwardly so.
At first glance, Chan’s candidacy appears straightforward: a first-generation immigrant from Hong Kong and Taiwan, a longtime public servant, and a labor-backed progressive championing affordable housing, tenant rights, and immigrant protections. Yet a closer examination reveals a documented tie that has quietly fueled debate among watchdogs, counterintelligence experts, and political opponents: Chan’s 2022 decision, as District 1 Supervisor, to designate Sing Tao Daily—a national Chinese-language newspaper with a documented history of alignment with Beijing—as an official city outreach venue for Chinese-speaking residents.
This single administrative action, buried in a routine media-contract amendment, has taken on new significance amid mounting U.S. intelligence warnings about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) United Front Work Department (UFWD) and its sophisticated influence operations inside American cities.
Sing Tao Daily registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) in 2021 precisely because of its role in advancing political narratives favorable to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The episode is not an isolated footnote. It sits within a larger pattern of UFWD activity in San Francisco, elite-capture tactics documented in the Bay Area, and a broader CCP strategy that U.S. officials have described as the most expansive foreign-influence campaign ever directed at the United States.
This investigation draws together publicly available information from counterintelligence assessments, local-government records, and open-source reporting. It does not allege criminality or hidden espionage on Chan’s part; rather, it probes the optics, the structural risks, and the broader context in which local decisions can intersect with great-power competition.
The goal is transparency in an election year when the FBI opens a new China-related counterintelligence case roughly every twelve hours and when UFWD-linked networks are documented across California.
From Chinatown immigrant to congressional contender
Connie Chan was born on October 8, 1978, in British Hong Kong. Her father worked as a police officer focused on youth programs; her mother was a social worker. When Chan was five, the family moved to Taiwan.
At age thirteen she immigrated to the United States, settling with her single mother and younger brother in a rent-controlled apartment in San Francisco’s Chinatown. Those early years—learning English, navigating a new city, watching her mother retrain as a claims processor at Chinese Hospital after taking classes at City College of San Francisco—shaped Chan’s political identity. She has frequently cited this immigrant experience as the foundation for her progressive politics.
Later roles included public-safety and communications aide and AAPI community liaison in then-District Attorney Kamala Harris’s office, legislative aide to Supervisor Aaron Peskin, and spokesperson and administrative positions at the San Francisco Recreation & Parks Department, City College of San Francisco, and the San Francisco Zoo and Gardens. She oversaw capital-improvement projects, park bonds, and the implementation of Free City College.
In November 2020 Chan won a narrow ranked-choice-voting victory (by just 134 votes) for District 1 Supervisor, succeeding term-limited Sandra Lee Fewer. She defeated moderate challenger Marjan Philhour in that race and again in the 2024 re-election, securing 51.9 percent in the final tabulation.
Major endorsements include U.S. Sen. Adam Schiff, the San Francisco Labor Council, the California Federation of Labor (its sole endorsement in the race), SEIU California, National Nurses United, various building-trades and teachers’ unions, former Mayors Willie Brown and Art Agnos, LGBTQ activist Cleve Jones, and the California Working Families Party.
The 2022 Sing Tao media contract amendment
As District 1 Supervisor, Chan proposed and successfully passed an amendment to a city contract designating Sing Tao Daily—along with its local San Francisco edition—as an official outreach venue for Chinese-speaking residents in neighborhoods including Chinatown, Visitacion Valley, the Richmond, the Sunset, and the Excelsior.
The amendment was framed as fulfilling a 1994 voter-approved law (Proposition J) governing city advertising and public-notice requirements. Sing Tao would join other outlets in publishing city notices, job listings, and community-service information aimed at limited-English-proficiency residents.
At the time, Sing Tao had recently registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) because U.S. authorities determined that its activities included political advocacy on behalf of the PRC government. Multiple investigative reports and congressional briefings have described Sing Tao as a propaganda outlet that consistently echoes CCP talking points on Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and U.S.-China relations. Critics argue that designating a FARA-registered entity as a city partner creates at least the appearance of official endorsement.
The decision drew sharp public criticism.
Independent Chinese-language publisher Portia Li of Wind Newspaper publicly accused Chan of favoritism. Li pointed to Chan’s positive coverage in Sing Tao and the fact that Chan had co-hosted an eight-week radio show on the outlet. Li argued that the amendment gave Sing Tao a competitive advantage and preferential access to city resources. Chan’s office defended the move as a pragmatic step to reach underserved immigrant communities in her district, noting that District 1 includes significant Chinese-American populations and that Sing Tao has broad circulation among them.
Chan has continued to appear frequently in Sing Tao media. She has used the outlet for bilingual outreach on city budget issues, tenant rights, and her congressional campaign. In the context of documented UFWD media-influence strategies, the repeated platform sharing has drawn renewed attention from national security observers.
Understanding Sing Tao Daily in the context of CCP media strategy
Sing Tao Daily is not an obscure local paper. It is a century-old Hong Kong-based publication with editions worldwide. Its U.S. operations, particularly the San Francisco edition, have been scrutinized for editorial alignment with Beijing.
FARA registration in 2021 was not a routine administrative step; it signaled that the outlet engages in activities intended to influence U.S. public opinion and policy on behalf of a foreign principal. U.S. intelligence assessments have repeatedly flagged Chinese-language media outlets—both state-owned and nominally independent—as key vectors for united-front work, narrative control, and subtle elite cultivation. Sing Tao’s content has been cited in congressional hearings for downplaying PRC human-rights concerns and amplifying pro-Beijing perspectives on issues critical to San Francisco’s Chinese-American voters, such as U.S. policy toward Taiwan and Hong Kong.
The decision to grant Sing Tao official city status therefore carries symbolic weight. It legitimizes an outlet that U.S. officials have identified as part of the CCP’s global propaganda architecture. In a congressional race where the winner will help shape U.S. legislation on export controls, Taiwan defense, technology competition, and counterintelligence, even routine media partnerships can become flashpoints.
The United Front Work Department’s broader architecture of influence
To understand why the Sing Tao episode matters, one must examine the United Front Work Department itself. The UFWD is a core organ of the CCP Central Committee, described by Xi Jinping as one of the Party’s three “magic weapons.”
Its mandate is to build alliances with, co-opt, and influence non-CCP individuals, groups, and organizations both inside and outside China. Under Xi it has been dramatically expanded and centralized. In the 2018 restructuring it absorbed the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and the State Administration for Religious Affairs, swelling its staff to an estimated 40,000. It now operates through specialized bureaus covering ethnic minorities, religious affairs, intellectuals, business elites, and—crucially—overseas Chinese work.
Abroad, the UFWD directs diaspora engagement through a web of seemingly independent front organizations: Overseas Chinese Service Centers (OCSCs), hometown associations, students-and-scholars associations (CSSAs), and chambers of commerce. These entities blend legitimate cultural and consular services with intelligence gathering, narrative shaping, and political mobilization. U.S. intelligence and congressional reports describe the UFWD as a “unique blend of engagement, influence activities, and intelligence operations.” It is not the Ministry of State Security (MSS), but it frequently provides cover, access, and human networks that support espionage goals.
In San Francisco the UFWD footprint is well-documented.
The city hosts an Overseas Chinese Service Center affiliated with the Chinese American Association of Commerce. The Chinese Consulate General serves as a coordination hub. During Xi Jinping’s 2023 APEC visit, UFWD-linked groups organized counter-protests against Tibetan, Uyghur, Hong Kong, and pro-democracy demonstrators—actions that included payments for participants and physical confrontations.
Jamestown Foundation mapping in 2026 identified thousands of UFWD-linked organizations across the United States, with especially dense networks in California owing to demographics and economic ties. These networks target politicians, media, academia, and community leaders through invitations to China, awards, relationship-building, and narrative amplification.
Media outlets like Sing Tao play a documented role in this ecosystem. They disseminate approved talking points, shape voter perceptions in Chinese-language communities, and provide platforms for sympathetic politicians. The UFWD’s overseas Chinese work explicitly seeks to mobilize diaspora voters, suppress criticism, and cultivate “elite capture”—identifying and influencing promising figures early in their careers.
Elite capture in the Bay Area
San Francisco and the broader Bay Area have been ground zero for documented CCP influence operations. The most prominent example remains the Christine Fang (“Fang Fang”) case. Between 2011 and 2015, Fang—a suspected MSS operative—networked aggressively with rising California politicians. She fundraised for then-Congressman Eric Swalwell’s 2014 re-election campaign, helped place an intern in his office, and cultivated relationships with other Democratic figures.
The FBI issued Swalwell a defensive briefing in 2015; he cut off contact and cooperated fully. The House Ethics Committee later closed its probe with no action. Fang herself was never charged and is believed to be in China. The case illustrated how UFWD-style networking can overlap with intelligence tradecraft: building proximity, gathering information, and positioning assets for future leverage.
Other Bay Area incidents reinforce the pattern.
Prosecutions have involved smuggling of advanced AI chips, cyber intrusions by MSS-linked hackers targeting universities and defense contractors, and attempts to recruit U.S. Navy personnel. Chinese entities have purchased farmland near military installations, including sites in California. The FBI has warned that the CCP views the region’s tech, research, and political ecosystems as high-value targets. In this environment, any elected official’s engagement with FARA-registered media inevitably invites scrutiny.
UFWD tactics in American congressional elections
U.S. intelligence assessments (ODNI Annual Threat Assessments 2024–2026) describe UFWD influence in congressional races as persistent but indirect. Rather than overt vote tampering, the strategy emphasizes down-ballot races in districts with significant Chinese-American populations. Tactics include:
- Diaspora mobilization through hometown associations and OCSCs that organize voter drives and endorsements framed around “community issues” but aligned with CCP priorities.
- Elite capture via early relationship-building with promising candidates.
- Media and disinformation through outlets that amplify favorable coverage or attack critics.
- Indirect financial flows via U.S.-based proxies who are naturalized citizens or entities.
- Transnational repression to deter or harass candidates critical of Beijing.
A 2023 Newsweek investigation documented more than $600,000 in contributions over decades from New York-area united-front figures to congressional and state candidates. House lawmakers have pressed for IRS and Treasury probes into tax-exempt nonprofits allegedly co-opted for political activity. While direct foreign contributions remain illegal and are aggressively prosecuted when discovered, the gray zone of small-donor patterns, community PACs, and media influence is harder to police.
Chan’s embrace of the ‘One-China Policy’ raises concerns
As voters weigh Chan’s bid to succeed Pelosi, one of the most revealing windows into her foreign-policy instincts has come not from national security hearings or detailed position papers, but from quiet meetings in Chinatown community halls and candidate forums where Chinese-American turnout could prove decisive.
Chan has explicitly endorsed the One-China Policy as the proper framework for U.S. engagement with both the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, which acknowledges Beijing as the sole legal government of China.
Chan’s positions on cross-strait relations have sparked pointed questions about whether they reflect pragmatic local politics, personal cultural affinities, or something more aligned with CCP-preferred narratives.
Chan has not released a comprehensive foreign-policy platform or delivered floor speeches on Taiwan; as a sitting supervisor rather than a member of Congress, she has had no occasion for the latter. Her views have instead emerged piecemeal through campaign appearances, private sessions with community leaders, her official website, and statements issued by her team.
Across these venues, a consistent theme emerges: direct dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, and skepticism toward what she describes as excessive U.S. dictation of terms.
She repeatedly invokes her personal biography—born in British Hong Kong, elementary school in Taiwan, immigration to San Francisco at age thirteen with family roots tracing to mainland China—as grounding her approach in lived experience rather than abstract ideology. She presents herself as a “daughter of many cultures” uniquely positioned to foster peaceful coexistence.
A particularly telling exchange occurred on February 9, 2026, when Chan met privately with three prominent San Francisco Chinese-American figures: Henry Der, a former California deputy superintendent of public instruction; community activist Sing Tang; and another respected elder. According to their detailed recollections, first reported by Mission Local on February 20, Chan left no ambiguity about her position. She voiced clear support for the One-China Policy, describing cross-strait relations as an “internal matter” best resolved directly between China and Taiwan.
The United States, she argued, should not be in the business of “dictating the terms and conditions.” Peace, she stressed repeatedly, must be the overriding objective. The attendees came away with the impression that Chan favored keeping heavy U.S. intervention out of the equation, a perspective they viewed as electorally resonant in neighborhoods where Taiwan remains a high-salience issue. The meeting itself was part of the candidates’ courtship of Chinese-American voters, who represent roughly 16 percent of the district electorate and maintain outsized influence in Chinatown and the Richmond District—precisely the areas Chan has represented on the Board of Supervisors.
This framing reappeared publicly weeks later at a March 2026 candidate forum held at Victory Hall in Chinatown. Facing more than 200 residents amid fresh discussion of Taiwan’s recent elections and escalating cross-strait military tensions, Chan was directly asked whether the United States should commit to using military force to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.
Unlike rival Saikat Chakrabarti, who answered affirmatively, Chan sidestepped a binary commitment. She instead emphasized the issue’s personal weight for her, given her Hong Kong and Taiwan upbringing, and cast the United States in the role of “agent for peace.”
Her recorded words were characteristic: “I advocate for us to really make sure that we encourage Taiwan and China that direct dialogue is important.” Observers noted how she leaned into her identity as the only major Chinese-American candidate in the race, an approach that appeared calibrated to avoid alienating pro-status-quo or pro-Beijing voices in the room while still sounding measured and diplomatic.
Chan’s campaign website reinforces this emphasis on engagement over confrontation. On the “Global Security” issues page, she writes:
“The world is large enough for every country to pursue sustainable and harmonious development. As the two largest economies in the world, both the United States and China can engage with one another through mutual respect, accountability and peaceful coexistence, safeguarding our national security while seeking common areas of agreement. While differences may exist on certain issues, Connie firmly believes these can and should be resolved through equal and constructive dialogue.”
The site also highlights her biographical ties: “Connie’s family roots trace back to mainland China. She was born in Hong Kong and attended elementary school in Taiwan, and she still has family members living in Hong Kong.” The language prioritizes “harmonious development,” “mutual respect,” and “peaceful coexistence”—phrasing that echoes official PRC diplomatic rhetoric and sits comfortably within the One-China Policy consensus.
To date, Chan has offered no public indication that she would push for diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Her supervisor record contains no foreign-policy votes, making these campaign-season articulations the clearest available guide to her thinking.
In a district where the next representative will help shape legislation on semiconductor export controls, Taiwan defense funding, and counterintelligence measures, voters and national-security observers are left to assess whether Chan’s emphasis on peaceful engagement represents prudent diplomacy or a reluctance to confront the more assertive aspects of CCP policy toward Taiwan.
Implications for the 2026 race
The CA-11 primary is more than a local contest. The winner will join a House that debates export controls on advanced semiconductors, military aid to Taiwan, counter-espionage legislation, and oversight of federal research funding—precisely the domains the CCP seeks to influence.
If Chan prevails, her documented media partnership with a FARA-registered outlet will likely face renewed national scrutiny. Opponents may weaponize the issue; supporters may dismiss it as Sinophobic. The real risk is subtler: a gradual normalization of united-front vectors in American politics that makes future elite-capture operations easier.
Broader lessons extend beyond one candidate. San Francisco’s UFWD footprint—OCSCs, consulate coordination, diaspora associations, and media partnerships—mirrors patterns documented nationwide. The Fang Fang precedent shows how early, seemingly innocuous networking can evolve into intelligence concerns. The proliferation of Chinese-owned farmland near military bases, cyber intrusions targeting universities, and pathogen-smuggling cases illustrate the scale of PRC activity in California.
UFWD operations exploit open societies: they blend legitimate community service with narrative control and political access. Sing Tao’s role in San Francisco is one visible node in that network.
Voters, journalists, and oversight bodies should demand clarity.
Has Chan received any defensive briefings from the FBI regarding foreign influence? Has her office reviewed the implications of partnering with FARA-registered entities? Will future congressional service include recusals on China-related legislation where conflicts could be perceived?
These are not accusations; they are prudent questions in 2026.
Beijing’s overseas police stations and the shadow of transnational repression in America
In recent years, the People’s Republic of China has quietly extended its domestic policing apparatus into American cities through a network of undeclared “overseas police stations” and affiliated service centers.
These outposts, operated by provincial branches of China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and often intertwined with United Front Work Department (UFWD) networks, claim to offer benign consular-style assistance—renewing driver’s licenses, providing legal aid, or helping with paperwork for overseas Chinese.
In practice, U.S. law enforcement and congressional investigators have documented their role in transnational repression: monitoring dissidents, issuing threats, coercing “voluntary” returns to China, and suppressing speech that Beijing finds inconvenient. The operations represent a direct challenge to U.S. sovereignty, circumventing formal extradition treaties and judicial processes while exploiting diaspora communities.
The most publicized case unfolded in New York’s Chinatown.
In 2022, the FBI raided a facility at 107 East Broadway operated by two U.S. citizens, Lu Jianwang and Chen Jinping, on behalf of the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau. The outpost—later described in federal charges as the first known overseas police station in the United States—functioned as a command node for the MPS’s “912 Special Project Working Group.”
Prosecutors alleged the pair, acting under direction from an MPS handler in China, tracked pro-democracy activists (including one in California), harassed a fugitive wanted by Beijing, and organized counter-protests against Falun Gong practitioners. Chen pleaded guilty in late 2024 to conspiring to act as an illegal agent of the PRC; Lu’s case continued.
The Manhattan station was no anomaly. Safeguard Defenders and subsequent U.S. investigations identified dozens of similar sites globally, with at least seven confirmed or suspected in the United States by 2023—including locations in New York (multiple), Los Angeles, Houston, and San Francisco.
San Francisco, home to one of the nation’s oldest and largest Chinese-American enclaves, has not escaped this pattern. Reports have flagged overseas Chinese service centers and police-linked outposts in the Bay Area, often housed within community associations or businesses tied to provincial Chinese authorities.
The Chinese Consulate General in San Francisco serves as a coordination hub, working alongside UFWD-affiliated groups to mobilize diaspora support and counter perceived threats. During Xi Jinping’s 2023 APEC summit visit to the city, UFWD-linked networks—some overlapping with these service centers—organized aggressive counter-demonstrations against Tibetan, Uyghur, Hong Kong, and pro-democracy protesters. Witnesses described paid participants, physical confrontations involving flagpoles and chemical spray, and direct coordination with consulate officials.
These incidents echoed the Manhattan station’s playbook: using ostensibly community-focused entities to enforce CCP red lines on American soil.
U.S. officials have repeatedly characterized the stations as tools of “transnational repression.” The FBI’s director has called the operations “outrageous” violations of sovereignty that bypass standard law-enforcement cooperation.
In response, Congress has acted. The Expel Illegal Chinese Police Act of 2025, reintroduced by Senator Tom Cotton and advanced in the House, targets Chinese police institutions, UFWD actors, and individuals establishing or maintaining such presences in the United States. It imposes visa bans, asset freezes, and sanctions precisely to deter what lawmakers describe as covert intimidation campaigns against American residents.
Parallel Senate resolutions have condemned the PRC’s broader pattern of harassment, family intimidation, and online disinformation aimed at silencing critics abroad. The Department of Justice has charged dozens of MPS officers in related schemes, underscoring that these are not rogue operations but coordinated state policy.
Critics note that the stations rarely involve literal “secret jails” in the sense of formal detention facilities on U.S. soil. Instead, the repression often manifests through psychological coercion, threats against family members still in China, or informal pressure sessions that mimic police interrogations.
Operatives have been accused of luring targets into meetings under false pretenses, recording them, and using the material to compel compliance. In some documented cases, dissidents have been driven to self-censorship or even “voluntary” repatriation without ever facing formal U.S. legal proceedings. This gray-zone approach—blending community service with surveillance—makes the network especially difficult to dismantle and particularly insidious in cities like San Francisco, where legitimate diaspora organizations and pro-Beijing proxies can blur together.
For a congressional candidate like Chan, whose district encompasses Chinatown, the Richmond, and the Sunset—precisely the neighborhoods these networks target—the environment raises uncomfortable questions. Her campaign has leaned heavily into Chinese-American voter outreach, and her public emphasis on “peace” and “direct dialogue” on cross-strait issues aligns with narratives frequently amplified by outlets like Sing Tao.
While there is no public evidence that Chan herself has interacted with overseas police operatives or UFWD handlers, the documented presence of these stations in her backyard illustrates how foreign influence can permeate local politics without overt espionage.
Community leaders assessing candidates have openly weighed positions on Taiwan and China through the lens of these pressures; private meetings and forums become venues where electability is judged not only by policy but by perceived alignment with Beijing’s sensitivities.
The broader pattern—elite cultivation, media partnerships, diaspora mobilization, and now shadow policing—forms a sophisticated ecosystem. U.S. intelligence assessments describe it as part of the CCP’s “magic weapon” strategy: winning influence without firing a shot.
Chan’s Sing Tao connection, however mundane in local terms, gains sharper relief against this backdrop. An outlet that registered under FARA for advancing PRC interests now holds official city status in a district where Chinese police outposts have been mapped and transnational repression cases prosecuted.
Voters in the June 2 primary are left to decide whether such intersections represent harmless pragmatism or a cautionary signal about how foreign actors may seek to shape representation in one of Congress’s most strategically vital seats.
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